The Posse Comitatus Act and the Fourth Amendment\u27s Exclusionary Rule by Walsh, Patrick & Sullivan, Paul
American University National Security Law Brief
Volume 8 | Issue 1 Article 1
2018
The Posse Comitatus Act and the Fourth
Amendment's Exclusionary Rule
Patrick Walsh
University of Virginia
Paul Sullivan
Creighton University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the National
Security Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University National Security Law Brief by an authorized editor
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walsh, Patrick and Sullivan, Paul "The Posse Comitatus Act and the Fourth Amendment's Exclusionary Rule," American University
National Security Law Brief, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/nslb/vol8/iss1/1
American University National Security Law Brief, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 2018), pp. 3–41. 
© 2018 by the American University National Security Law Brief at Washington College of Law. 
All rights reserved. 
The Posse Comitatus Act and 
the Fourth Amendment’s 
Exclusionary Rule 
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Walsh and Paul Sullivan 
 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
The United States has, throughout its history, continually called upon 
the U.S. military to deploy inside the United States to respond to dis-
asters, to protect citizens in times of war, and even to perform acts of 
law enforcement during civil unrest. At the same time, Americans 
have a long-standing and inherent distrust of the use of the military 
on U.S. soil, particularly for law enforcement activities. These two 
competing interests—to use the military in times of need but restrict 
its domestic use for law enforcement—have created a mix of court 
cases that apply different tests to determine when the military has ex-
ceeded its legal authority to operate inside the United States. 
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The court’s primary tool for restricting the use of the military as 
domestic law enforcement is to use the Fourth Amendment’s exclu-
sionary rule to suppress evidence gathered in violation of the 
restrictions on the domestic use of the military. Recently, the Supreme 
Court has reevaluated and restricted the application of the exclusion-
ary rule. The Court has emphasized that the exclusionary rule should 
be judiciously applied to suppress evidence of criminal activity. 
Courts need to follow this recent Supreme Court guidance and recog-
nize that the exclusionary rule should not be used to suppress 
evidence derived from the domestic use of the military. 
This article will examine both the use of the military inside the 
United States and the recent restrictions on applying the exclusionary 
rule to deter government violations of law. The article will highlight 
where these areas of the law intersect in the courts—when criminal 
defendants seek the application of the exclusionary rule to exclude 
evidence gathered while the military was engaged in an impermissi-
ble act of law enforcement. By examining recent military operations 
inside the United States and looking at the evolving development of 
the exclusionary rule, there is a clear answer: the Fourth Amend-
ment’s exclusionary rule is misused when courts apply it to the mili-
tary’s domestic law enforcement activity. 
Section II will examine the development of the use—and misuse—
of the military inside the United States to conduct law enforcement 
activity. Section III will explore the development of the exclusionary 
rule, including the recent Supreme Court opinions that have empha-
sized the exclusionary rule’s limited purpose. Section IV will examine 
the recent judicial applications of the exclusionary rule to law 
enforcement activity by the military, and review how the lower courts 
are ruling in a manner that is inconsistent with current Supreme Court 
guidance on the exclusionary rule. Section V will synthesize these two 
conflicts and explain how the exclusionary rule is an ineffective and 
sometimes counterproductive mechanism to deter law enforcement 
activity by the military. 
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I I .  DOMESTIC MIL ITARY OPERATIONS AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Throughout its history, the United States has had a complicated rela-
tionship with the use of the military for domestic law enforcement. 
Some of the primary complaints against Great Britain that preceded 
the Declaration of Independence involved the use of the British mili-
tary inside the Colonies.1 Despite this unease, the U.S. Constitution 
anticipates and permits the domestic use of the military.2 Congress 
sanctioned the use of the military to enforce the law early on in U.S. 
history.3 The controversy continued during and after the American 
Civil War, when Congress initially reaffirmed the domestic use of the 
military to enforce the law and later criminalizing use of the military 
for domestic law enforcement.4 Exploring the tension about the need 
to use the military for law enforcement and the concerns over doing 
so will be explored in this section. 
A. The Declaration of Independence, the Articles 
of Confederation, and the U.S. Constitution 
In the years before the drafting of the Constitution and the passing of 
the Bill of Rights, America struggled with the role of military in 
domestic affairs.5 American colonists objected to the use of the British 
Army to enforce British law and supplant the civil law of the 
                                                     
1 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13, 16 (U.S. 1776); David McCullough, 
JOHN ADAMS 65 (2001); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right 
to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 389–92 (2003). 
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; id. art. IV, § 4. 
3 Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795); Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 
1 Stat. 424 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2000)). 
4 See Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 
124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage Is Done, 175 MIL. L. 
REV. 86, 95–96 (2003) (explaining that the sheriff’s power to use the military in law 
enforcement pre-dated the Framers’ concern over centralized power at the time the 
Constitution was drafted). 
5 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13, 16 (U.S. 1776); see U.S. CONST. amend. 
III; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, VII, IX; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 22–
23 (1972); David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military 
Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1971); Clarence I. Meeks, III, Illegal Law 
Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MIL. L. REV. 
83, 86 (1975). 
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Colonies.6 The Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and the 
amendments to the Constitution included law that restricted and lim-
ited the power and use of the military.7 At the same time, the early 
Congresses authorized presidents to use the military on U.S. soil to 
battle insurrectionists, respond to threats, and even enforce some fed-
eral laws.8 The first leaders of America struggled, much as today’s 
leaders have, to define the proper use of the military for domestic 
activities.9 
i.  The Declaration of Independence and Its Objections to 
the Military as a Law Enforcement Body 
Colonists who moved from Great Britain to the New World brought 
with them ideas that the military should not be used for domestic law 
enforcement.10 Consequently, these colonists believed they were being 
treated unjustly when King George sent the British Army into the 
colonial cities to enforce British law and order.11 The British Army 
occupied the city of Boston from 1768 to 1770 to exert control over the 
unruly colonists and enforce British taxes.12 The perceived injustice of 
being subject to military enforcement of civil law increased opposition 
to the British monarchy. Rather than decrease opposition, the employ-
ment of British troops in law enforcement actually led to an increase 
in violence between occupying British forces and the colonists.13 
                                                     
6 Kealy, supra note 1, at 389–92. 
7 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13, 16 (U.S. 1776); see U.S. CONST. amend. 
III; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, VII, IX; Laird, 408 U.S. at 22–23; 
Engdahl, supra note 5, at 1; Meeks, supra note 5, at 86 (discussing the Framers’ concerns 
over military involvement in the lives of civilians absent civilian control). 
8 Calling Forth Act of 1792; Militia Act of 1795; Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119; 
Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 96. 
9 See generally BENNETT MILTON RICH, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL DISORDER 21, 25–26 (1941) 
(discussing the use of troops to quell Fries’s Rebellion). 
10 See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the role of due process in preventing the 
use of military force in suppressing civil disorders); see also FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA 
CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 1300–1629, at 68 (1948); 
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 49 (2d ed. 1716). 
11 Kealy, supra note 1, at 390. 
12 Id. at 389–92. 
13 MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 65. 
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On March 5, 1770, when British troops and colonists confronted 
each other amid protests in Boston, the troops fired, killing five men.14 
This use of British troops as a “force of uniformed peace-keepers, or 
policemen,” which resulted in the death of protesters, came to be 
known as the “Boston Massacre.”15 Despite the public outcry follow-
ing the deaths, British troops continued to patrol the streets of the 
Colonies and enforce British taxes and regulations through the 
1770s.16 
Six years after the Boston Massacre, Thomas Jefferson included 
grievances in the Declaration of Independence that cited the misuse of 
the British troops for law enforcement.17 Jefferson’s list of grievances 
included the keeping of “standing armies” in times of peace, render-
ing the British military “independent of and superior to the Civil 
power,” and “quartering of large bodies of armed troops among us.”18 
These concerns were remembered when the founding republic estab-
lished its first government with the passage of the Articles of 
Confederation. 
ii.  The Articles of Confederation and Their 
Restrictions on the Military 
The Articles of Confederation—in establishing the first national 
government for the United States—reflected the Founding Fathers’ 
concerns over the domestic use of the military.19 The Articles required 
that, in peacetime, the Armed Forces must be limited only to the size 
that was absolutely necessary for the national defense and that the 
military must always be subject to civilian control.20 The Articles 
favored the traditional state militias (with part-time soldiers instead 
of professionals) and with officers appointed by and beholden to the 
                                                     
14 Id. at 65–66; HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 135 (Easton Press 1987) (1971). 
15 ZOBEL, supra note 14, at 135. 
16 See Meeks, supra note 5, at 86. 
17 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13, 16 (U.S. 1776). 
18 Id. 
19 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, VII, IX (establishing civilian control 
of the military and limiting military size based on national defense needs). 
20 Id. 
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States for their position.21 These restrictions along with a weak central 
government were insufficient to protect the nation and the Founding 
Fathers convened again to create an improved and stronger central 
government. 
iii.  The U.S. Constitution and Its Regulation of 
the Military 
The U.S. Constitution granted broader powers to the federal govern-
ment to raise and maintain a military, but it also maintained prior 
safeguards that regulated the use of the military inside the United 
States.22 During the Constitutional Convention, some delegates raised 
concerns about permitting a standing army, but the majority over-
ruled these concerns.23 The Constitution granted Congress the power 
to raise a standing army, but imposed safeguards on it from both the 
legislative and executive branch.24 The new Constitution also gave the 
military a domestic role, to “suppress Insurrections” and, perhaps, to 
protect against “domestic Violence.”25 These constitutional provisions 
raised some concerns about the misuse of the military inside the 
United States, and states called for a “Bill of Rights” to amend the 
Constitution to address these concerns.26 
The Bill of Rights created additional restrictions on the domestic 
use of the military to address the fears of misuse.27 The Second 
Amendment guaranteed a well-regulated militia loyal to the states, 
and the right for citizens to maintain arms.28 The Third Amendment 
                                                     
21 Id. 
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art, II, § 2. 
23 ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDER, 
1789–1878, at 4–12 (1988); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 140, 180–81 (1990). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2. (granting Congress the power to review military 
appropriations, the power to raise the standing army, the power to declare war, and 
making the military subordinate to the President). 
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; id. art. IV, § 4. 
26 See THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 122–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright 
ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 296 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright 
ed., 1961). 
27 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1972). 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also Laird, 408 U.S. at 22–23. 
THE  POSSE  COMITATUS  ACT 
9 
addressed the very concerns that inflamed Boston residents at the 
time of the Boston Massacre, prohibiting the housing of federal troops 
in citizens’ homes against their wishes.29 These restrictions directly ad-
dressed the serious concerns Americans had about the misuse of the 
British Army before American independence. The amendments 
assuaged some of the concerns about using the military domestically, 
because the early Congress often used the military to enforce federal 
law.30 
After the Constitution was ratified, Congress assembled and began 
exercising its legislative authority and began to permit the domestic 
use of the military. First, Congress authorized the President to call the 
militia to protect the frontier from “hostile incursions of the Indians.”31 
Next, Congress enabled the militias to respond to invasion, insurrec-
tion, and obstruction of the laws.32 These acts permitted the President 
to call forth the militia for a limited time, when “the laws of the United 
States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed . . .”33 The 
President had authority to act only after he issued a proclamation 
commanding the “insurgents” to disperse.34 
iv.  The Use of the Military by the Founding Fathers 
President George Washington first used this “calling forth” authority 
to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania, an insur-
rection that rebelled against federal government taxes on the 
production of whiskey.35 In activating the state militia to suppress the 
                                                     
29 U.S. CONST. amend. III; see also Laird, 408 U.S. at 22–23. 
30 See Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795) (granting the 
President authority to use state militias to defend against domestic threats). 
31 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, 1. Stat. 96; Id. § 16, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (repealed 1795) 
(regulating the military establishment of the United States). 
32 Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2000)); 
Calling Forth Act of 1792. 
33 Calling Forth Act of 1792 § 2. 
34 Id. § 3. 
35 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 1411 (1794) (Gales and Seaton 1855) (proclamation of 
President Washington, Aug. 7, 1794); id. 1413 (proclamation of President Washington, 
Sept. 25, 1794) (discussing the implications of the proclamations and their use during 
the Whiskey Rebellion); STEVEN R. BOYD, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST AND PRESENT 
PERSPECTIVES 123 (1985); 5 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AMERICAN UNIVERS ITY  NATIONAL SECURITY LA W BRIEF  
10 
insurrection, Congress and the President understood that the military 
was there only to assist civilian power in enforcing the law, not to sup-
plant local authority.36 The civilian federal law enforcement and the 
civilian federal courts maintained primary authority to enforce the tax 
and prosecute offenders. 
The Founding Fathers who ratified the new Constitution continued 
to use the military inside the United States without significant objec-
tion.37 Each use was in support of the civilian authorities and 
sometimes directly supported law enforcement. The military was 
used by President John Adams to suppress the 1799 Fries Rebellion 
with little objection.38 The military arrested the leader, John Fries, and 
other conspirators, and turned them over to civil authorities for pros-
ecution.39 President Thomas Jefferson called out federal troops to 
enforce the Embargo Act, a tax opposed by Vermont traders.40 
Congress ratified the action by amending the Embargo Act to permit 
the use of federal troops to enforce it.41 
In each of these instances, there was general support for using the 
military to enforce domestic law. However, each instance involved the 
President calling forth the military only with the approval of 
Congress. The military acted to enforce civilian law, but did so in sup-
port of the civilian law enforcement, and did not supplant or usurp 
civilian authority. Therefore, the early leaders of America both under-
stood the dangers posed by using the military as a domestic enforcer 
                                                     
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 158–62 (1896); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY 
REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 165, 196–97 (1986). 
36 See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 49–50 (explaining the doctrinal role of military troops in 
assisting in the enforcement of civilian law). 
37 See generally FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, 1787–
1903, S. Doc. No. 57-209, at 38, 51, 57 (1903) (providing an overview of the use of federal 
troops in providing aid during domestic disturbances from 1787 to 1922 and specific 
instances of use by several early presidents). 
38 RICH, supra note 9, at 21, 25–26. 
39 President John Adams, Proclamation of March 12, 1799, reprinted in WILSON, supra 
note 37, at 43. 
40 Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (repealed 1809) (calling for an embargo on all 
ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States). 
41 Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506, 510 (repealed 1809) (authorizing the use of 
federal troops in enforcement of the Embargo Act). 
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of the law, and the need to still use the military on occasion to enforce 
domestic law. 
Prior to the Civil War, the federal government used the military 
domestically for other purposes. The military was called upon to pre-
vent U.S. flagged vessels from violating U.S. neutrality in European 
wars,42 to detain and seize illegally armed vessels preparing to fight 
in foreign wars,43 to defeat the conspiracy of Aaron Burr,44 and for 
other purposes.45 Each of these involved the use of the military to en-
force civil law, but the military was enforcing laws that seem to fit 
comfortably in the military’s primary mission to defend the nation. 
There was little concern about the use of the military in these 
circumstances. 
Concerns about using the military domestically increased dramat-
ically before and after the Civil War, when civilian authorities began 
to use the military as a posse comitatus46 and in other ways to enforce 
civil law that was not related to the military’s primary purpose. The 
military—or to be more specific—the Union Army, began to play a 
greater role in the enforcement of the law, and often against the will 
of the local population. The tensions at the founding of America 
regarding the use of the military to enforce laws returned. 
                                                     
42 See generally Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 (repealed 1818) (prohibiting U.S. 
citizens from joining in or supporting military activities of foreign states); CHARLES G. 
FENWICK, THE NEUTRALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 15–18 (1913) (describing early 
neutrality statutes and the U.S. position on avoiding entanglements in foreign wars). 
43 Act of June 5, 1794, § 7, 1 Stat. 381, 384. 
44 President Thomas Jefferson, Message to Congress on the Burr Conspiracy (Jan. 22, 
1807), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid 
=65721; see also WILSON, supra note 37, at 48. 
45 See Proclamation No. 194, 16 Stat. 1136 (Oct. 12, 1870) (prohibiting citizens of the 
United States from engaging in military enterprises against countries with whom the 
United States is at peace); FENWICK, supra, note 42, at 15–18 (proposing to stop U.S. aid 
to Canadian rebels); RICHARDSON, supra note 35, at 7–8 (discussing actions taken to stop 
an expedition preparing to attack Cuba); WILSON, supra note 37, at 51–53 (discussing 
U.S. actions to halt militant activity on the Canadian border). 
46 Posse comitatus is discussed in detail in the next section. It generally refers to the power 
of a law enforcement officer to compel the assistance of citizens to help the officer 
enforce the law. See infra Section II.B.i. 
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B.  Posse Comitatus, the Civil War and 
Reconstruction 
The domestic use of the military began to change in the decades prior 
to the Civil War. While the Founding Fathers approved the use of the 
military domestically for law enforcement activities like enforcing 
neutrality and suppressing riots that oppose the taxation systems, the 
early history predominately involved the President or Congress di-
recting the military to act.47 On some occasions, like the Whiskey Re-
bellion, the President actually led the soldiers in the domestic 
operation.48 As the Civil War grew closer, the decision to use the mil-
itary for law enforcement was delegated to lower and lower levels of 
government. Federal and state officials in local communities began to 
call soldiers to assist local law enforcement under a common-law 
doctrine called posse comitatus.49 
i.  Posse Comitatus 
Common law authorized county sheriffs to require able-bodied men 
to assist them in arresting fugitives and in performing other law en-
forcement activities.50 Prior to American independence, state and 
county law enforcement officials in the Colonies continued to exert 
this British common-law authority.51 When Congress created federal 
marshals, the federal equivalent of a county sheriff, Congress granted 
                                                     
47 See RICH, supra note 9, at 21, 25–26; SLAUGHTER, supra note 35, 165, 196–97 (1986); 
Engdahl, supra note 5, at 49–50 (explaining the doctrinal role of military troops in 
assisting in the enforcement of civilian law). 
48 HENRY M. BRACKENRIDGE, HISTORY OF THE WESTERN INSURRECTION IN WESTERN 
PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONLY CALLED THE WHISKEY INSURRECTION (1859); WILLIAM 
FINDLEY, HISTORY OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE FOUR WESTERN COUNTIES OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 195 (1796); WILSON, supra note 37, at 32–34 (discussing U.S. actions to 
halt militant activity on the Canadian border). 
49 See Felicetti & Luce, supra note 4, at 95–96 (discussing the lack of an explicit limit on 
the ability of local governments to call upon soldiers for law enforcement). 
50 See id. 
51 See United States v. Hart, 545 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D.N.D. 1982) (holding that common 
law permits a sheriff to organize a posse); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 817 (George Sharswood ed., 1893) (stating that a sheriff has 
posse comitatus power to require citizens to assist in the arrest of felons). 
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them this common-law authority of posse comitatus.52 As a result, 
there were federal law enforcement officers in every federal district 
who could require all local citizens to assist them in enforcing federal 
law. This authority to call upon private citizens to form a posse was 
without controversy. However, the controversy returned when mar-
shals and sheriffs began to use this authority to require not just 
civilians, but also federal troops and state militias, to assist in 
enforcing federal law.53 
As the practice of using the military to support law enforcement 
grew, Congress began to legislate the use of the posse comitatus to 
enforce the law.54 The Fugitive Slave Act was one such law.55 Pursuant 
to the act, owners of escaped slaves were entitled to an arrest warrant 
for the slave.56 Federal marshals were required to execute these war-
rants, and the marshal could require the assistance of “all good citi-
zens” in the county.57 The act did not specifically state that the marshal 
could require the assistance of soldiers, but it also did not prohibit the 
use of the military to assist civilian police.58 After fierce opposition to 
the law occurred in Boston and elsewhere, the President issued a proc-
lamation requiring the military to assist federal marshals who were 
executing federal warrants for former slaves who had fled to a state 
that prohibited slavery.59 The Secretary of War affirmed this procla-
mation with an order to federal troops to assist marshals if needed.60 
                                                     
52 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (granting marshals the authority to 
appoint deputies and command assistance); see also Calling Forth Act, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 
264, 265 (1792) (repealed 1795) (stating that marshals have same powers under federal 
law as sheriffs have under state law). 
53 See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1757 (1856) (proposing legislation and 
discussion by Congress of local authorities to use the military as a posse comitatus). 
54 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 5, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (repealed 1864). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. at 462–63. 
59 Proclamation of Feb. 18, 1851, 9 Stat. 1006 (President Millard Fillmore’s proclamation 
requiring the military to assist with enforcement of the act); WILSON, supra note 37, at 
62. 
60 WILSON, supra note 37, at 62. 
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Even the Senate Judiciary Committee agreed that federal marshals 
could use the military as a posse comitatus.61 
The U.S. Attorney General concurred in the use of the military to 
enforce federal, state, and local law. Attorney General Caleb Cushing 
issued an opinion stating that soldiers stationed in a county were part 
of the posse comitatus and were required to assist law enforcement.62 
Armed with the concurrence of the President, Congress, the Secretary 
of War, and the Attorney General, law enforcement began robust use 
of the military to enforce the law, especially laws that were unpopular 
with the local community.63 The military chain of command could be 
relied on to enforce unpopular laws even when local police officers 
might use their discretion and decline to enforce unpopular criminal 
laws in their jurisdiction. This expanded use of the military to enforce 
unpopular laws appeared to be partisan—used by one political party 
to enforce laws unpopular with an opposing party.64 Since the military 
was not supposed to favor one political party over another, this use of 
the military appeared inappropriate.65 The use, or misuse, of the mili-
tary to enforce civilian law heightened during, and after, the Civil 
War. 
ii.  Posse Comitatus and the Civil War 
The exigencies brought on by the Civil War led to an expansion of the 
use of the military to enforce civil law.66 In 1861, Congress authorized 
the President to use the state militias or federal army when it was not 
practicable to enforce the law through civilian law enforcement.67 
Before the Civil War, the military could be used as a posse comitatus, 
or otherwise to enforce the law, only if they remained subordinate to 
                                                     
61 COAKLEY, supra note 23, at 130; S. REP. NO. 31-320 (1851). 
62 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 466, 473 (1854); see also COAKLEY, supra note 23, at 133–37. 
63 RICHARDSON, supra note 35, at 358; see also 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 522 (1860). 
64 See supra note 53, at 1813 (1856) (proposed legislation and discussion by Congress 
disapproving of the use of the military in Kansas as a posse comitatus). 
65 Id. 
66 See Kealy, supra note 1, at 393. 
67 Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 8, 12 Stat. 281. 
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civil authority.68 As the Civil War developed, the military began to as-
sert authority to enforce law without deference to civil law enforce-
ment. As the Union Army began to win battles and secure land in 
secessionist states, it began to reassert the law of the union and engage 
in all areas of law enforcement. 
iii.  Posse Comitatus and Reconstruction 
After the war ended, the Union Army took control of the government 
of some of the defeated Southern states.69 Under their own direction, 
the military kept public order, enforced taxes on whiskey production, 
arrested members of the Klu Klux Klan, and guarded polling places.70 
The military even seized several state legislatures and became 
involved in local political matters and resolved local disputes between 
whites and former slaves.71 The most controversial use of the military 
was to protect polling stations in the highly disputed election between 
Samuel J. Tilden and Rutherford B. Hayes.72 
Hayes won very close elections in South Carolina, Louisiana, and 
Florida.73 In those same states, President Ulysses Grant ordered the 
Union Army to assist federal marshals in protecting the polling sta-
tions.74 Some argued the military’s assistance and presence at the polls 
helped sway the election in these states, and the overall presidency to 
Hayes.75 A dispute over who won the election ensued.76 Ultimately, 
                                                     
68 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 522 (1860). 
69 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (creating the military districts to 
govern defeated states). 
70 James P. O’Shaugnhessy, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics 
Reconsidered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 703, 704–10 (1976). 
71 Kealy, supra note 1, at 393. 
72 See 5 CONG. REC. 2117 (1877) (remarks of Rep. Banning claiming that soldiers did the 
Hayes campaign’s “dirty work”). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL, EMANCIPATING SLAVES, ENSLAVING FREE MEN: A 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 321 (1996) (arguing that the Army preferred 
Hayes and therefore helped sway the election); see also H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions 
Upon the Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, 27 MIL. L. REV. 85, 94 (1960). 
76 HUMMEL, supra note 75, at 321. 
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Congress resolved the disputed election, and Hayes secured the pres-
idency the day before Inauguration Day.77 As a concession to his 
opponents, President Hayes agreed to withdraw troops from the 
South, and he signed a law criminalizing the use of the Army as a 
posse comitatus.78 Congress and the President then began a process to 
restrict the use of the military in domestic affairs, especially domestic 
law enforcement at the order of local officials. 
C.  Restoring Limits on the Military by 
Criminalizing Posse Comitatus 
During Reconstruction, southern legislators objected to the intrusive 
and prolonged use of the military for domestic law enforcement. The 
military had far exceeded its historic domestic responsibilities. Local 
officials, not the President, had the ability to require the military to 
assist in enforcing domestic law at the local level. This local military 
intrusion into criminal-law enforcement went beyond the expecta-
tions and desires of Americans, and in 1878, Congress passed the 
Posse Comitatus Act to restore the limitations on the ability of local 
officials to the military to arrest offenders and enforce the law.79 
The Posse Comitatus Act passed with little fanfare in an appropri-
ations bill in 1878.80 The current version of the statute reads: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly author-
ized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of 
the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute 
the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two 
years, or both.81 
                                                     
77 Kealy, supra note 1, at 394. 
78 HUMMEL, supra note 75, at 321; Kealy, supra note 1, at 394. 
79 See Posse Comitatus Act, §15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 
1385 (2016)). 
80 See id. 
81 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The early version was substantially similar, but it was later 
amended to include the Air Force after it was separated from the Army and became its 
own branch of the Armed Forces. Presumably, Congress initially excluded the Navy 
and the Marine Corps because they did not pose the same risk of domestic law 
enforcement as the Army. Later, Congress passed a separate law requiring the 
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The law clearly prohibits federal marshals and county sheriffs from 
calling military units into service as a posse comitatus.82 It also prohibits 
the use of the Army to “execute the laws,” implying a broader scope 
to the prohibition.83 The act is also a criminal statute—violation of 
which is a felony.84 However, there are no reported convictions of sol-
diers, airmen, or anyone else for violating the act.85 Despite this, 
numerous state and federal courts have issued opinions on the act.86 
These cases routinely involve a defendant who is trying to suppress 
evidence in his criminal prosecution because the military’s involve-
ment violated the Posse Comitatus Act.87 The court decisions create 
differing and inconsistent rulings on what constitutes a Posse Comi-
tatus Act violation and what the consequence of that violation should 
be.88 Reviewing these cases demonstrate that the military still acts as 
a posse comitatus and/or is used to execute the laws in violation of the 
Posse Comitatus Act, even though no one is prosecuted.89 
There is a reason why there have been repeated violations of the 
Posse Comitatus Act but no prosecutions. A tension still exists 
                                                     
Department of Defense to issue regulations restricting the Navy and the Marine Corps 
from engaging in improper domestic law enforcement. See 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2011). 
82 See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 867 (2d ed. 1920). 
83 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2016). 
84 See id. 
85 Furman, supra note 75, at 94 (discussing reports that, in 1879, two Army officers were 
indicted in Texas for providing U.S. marshals with troops to enforce revenue laws, but 
there is no record that they were convicted); see also G. NORMAN LIEBER, OFFICE OF THE 
JUDGE ADVOCATE, U.S. WAR DEP’T, DOC. NO. 64, THE USE OF THE ARMY IN AID OF THE 
CIVIL POWER 28 n.1 (1898); Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: 
A Principle in Need of Renewal, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 953, 961 (1997). 
86 See Hammond, supra note 85, at 953, 961, 965–67. 
87 See Casper v. United States, 430 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266 
(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); United States v. Red Feather, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975), aff’d, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 
1976); People v. Burden, 288 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (applying the 
exclusionary rule to a drug investigation in which a member of the U.S. Air Force 
participated with the approval of his commander), rev'd, 303 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 1981); 
Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (applying the exclusionary rule for 
a Posse Comitatus Act violation as a result of a military police officer’s active 
participation in a search and arrest); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 
(D.N.D. 1975); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974). 
88 See Hammond, supra note 85, at 953, 961, 965–67. 
89 See Burden, 288 N.W.2d at 392, rev'd, 303 N.W.2d 444; Taylor, 645 P.2d at 522. 
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between the need to call on the military to assist the civilian popula-
tion during emergencies, and the traditional American reluctance to 
having the military enforce the civil law. Some scholars argue the 
Posse Comitatus Act embodies a larger principle of American concern 
of a standing army that may restrict individual liberties, but the failure 
to prosecute violations also hints at a desire to continue to have access 
to the military when dire circumstances arise.90 Put another way, a 
court is willing to acknowledge when the military acts beyond its legal 
mandate, but may find it extremely difficult to convict an Army officer 
for using his soldiers in a time of crisis to assist civilian authorities. 
The Posse Comitatus Act highlights a clear struggle in the Ameri-
can psyche between what Americans want the law to say and what 
Americans want the military to do in times of crisis. There is an 
equally compelling struggle right now over the Fourth Amendment’s 
restrictions on police conduct and the application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
 
I I I .  DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE  
At the same time the Founding Fathers crafted restrictions on the use 
of the military inside the United States, they also created protections 
for citizens from overreaching law enforcement activity.91 The military 
restrictions were incorporated into the Constitution, and additional 
restrictions were added in the Second and Third Amendments to the 
Constitution.92 The restrictions on law enforcement were passed with 
even greater prominence, being both incorporated in the body of the 
                                                     
90 Cf. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 4, at 91 (arguing that there is “a broader policy or ‘spirit’ 
behind the [Posse Comitatus] Act”). 
91 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III; id. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII. 
92 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress appropriations powers over the 
military, the power to raise a standing army and the power to declare war); id. art. II, § 
2 (making the military subordinate to the civilian authority of the President); id. amend. 
II (creating the right to a militia under state control and the right of citizens to keep 
arms); id. amend. III (prohibiting the federal government from housing troops in 
citizens’ homes without the consent of the owner); see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 
22–23 (discussing these constitutional rights). There are other restrictions as well, but 
these are provided as illustration of some key restrictions. 
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Constitution and added into the Fourth, Fifth, Six, and Eighth Amend-
ments.93 Similar to the military restrictions mentioned in the previous 
section, these restrictions were included to address specific abuses by 
the British government against the Colonies.94 These blanket 
restrictions and prohibitions on government conduct created clear 
individual rights but, with one notable exception, they failed to estab-
lish the appropriate remedy, should the government or its agents vi-
olate those rights.95 Over the course of American jurisprudence, courts 
formulated a doctrine of exclusion, that evidence obtained in violation 
of constitutional rights should be excluded from the government’s 
efforts to prosecute citizens.96 This judicial doctrine of excluding evi-
dence obtained by the government in violation of the law was created 
with the Fourth Amendment.97 
A.  Creation and Growth of the 
Exclusionary Rule 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable govern-
ment searches and seizures, but it does not explain what remedies are 
available for a violation of this constitutional right.98 The Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution reads: 
                                                     
93 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III (creating an independent judiciary and giving Congress 
the ability to create inferior courts that can examine police conduct); id. amend. IV 
(requiring law enforcement to obtain search warrants and refrain from unreasonable 
searches); id. amend. V (creating a litany of essential rights like due process, the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to indictment by a grand jury and others); 
id. amend. VI (granting the right to speedy trial, right to a jury, right to confrontation of 
witnesses and right to assistance of counsel); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and 
unusual punishment, and excessive bail). 
94 1 HOMER C. HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1776–
1826, at 74 (1939); JACOB LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966). 
95 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing a remedy by prohibiting self-incrimination). 
96 See generally David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
97 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Gray, supra note 96; Christine M. D’Elia, Comment, The 
Exclusionary Rule: Who Does It Punish?, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 563, 564–65 (1995). 
98 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and 
requiring search warrants without proscribing a remedy for violations of these rights). 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.99 
Nowhere in the language of this text is a suggestion that the rem-
edy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is the exclusion of evi-
dence.100 For almost a century, the courts did not craft any remedy for 
Fourth Amendment violations.101 In 1886, the Supreme Court finally 
addressed the issue of remedies when it created the exclusionary rule 
in a forfeiture case.102 In Boyd v. United States, the defendant was com-
pelled to produce evidence showing the value and quantity of the 
goods that were to be forfeited.103 The goods were ordered forfeited 
and Boyd appealed, claiming the forced production of evidence was 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.104 The Supreme Court agreed 
and, for the first time, determined that evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded from court proceed-
ings.105 This judicial rule of exclusion was created by analogizing to 
the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of the introduction of compelled 
testimony.106 Later courts have disagreed over whether the exclusion-
ary rule is a protection required by the Constitution, or merely a 
matter of judicial interpretation, or part of the court’s “supervisory 
power.”107 Some courts argue that the exclusionary rule is “not a com-
                                                     
99 Id. 
100 Id.; see also D’Elia, supra note 97, at 563. 
101 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (excluding evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
102 Id. at 638; see also Richard A. Epstein, Entick v Carrington and Boyd v United States: 
Keeping the Fourth and Fifth Amendments on Track, 82 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 27 (2015). 
103 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638. 
104 Id. at 618. 
105 Id. at 638. 
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V (mandating that no person may be compelled “in a criminal 
case to be a witness against himself”); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633–34. 
107 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992) (suggesting the exclusionary rule 
is part of Court’s supervisory powers); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 1.1(d) (5th ed. 2015). 
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mand of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of ev-
idence which Congress may negate.”108 Others disagree, stating that 
when read in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment, “a constitu-
tional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the 
exclusionary rule.”109 
This “exclusionary rule” was methodically expanded to en-
compass more and more Fourth Amendment violations.110 In Weeks v. 
United States, the Supreme Court excluded evidence seized from an 
illegal search of the defendant’s home.111 In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme 
Court applied the exclusionary rule to state courts for state searches 
that violated the Fourth Amendment.112 These cases and others cre-
ated the foundation of the exclusionary rule, but they only hinted at 
the overall purpose of excluding competent evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.113 
As courts began to expand the exclusionary rule, they also began 
to question when it is appropriate to exclude competent evidence of 
guilt because of inappropriate actions of government officials. Courts 
have struggled with the fundamental question of whether the exclu-
sionary rule is required by the Constitution, whether it is appropriate 
for statutory or regulatory violations, and whether a court must 
determine that excluding evidence satisfies the fundamental purpose 
of the exclusionary rule. 
B.  Identifying the Purpose of the 
Exclusionary Rule 
Many judicial opinions exclude evidence when the courts can connect 
the exclusion to the purpose of the exclusionary rule. A major purpose 
                                                     
108 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28, 32–33 (1949). 
109 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); see also TRACEY MACLIN, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE, 88–110, 
121–124 (2013). 
110 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (applying the exclusionary rule to 
evidence seized from an illegal search); Wolf, 338 U.S. at 25. 
111 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662; see also MACLIN, supra note 109, at 8–14, 17–24. 
112 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656–57. 
113 LAFAVE, supra note 107, at § 1.1(f) (stating that Weeks and Boyd suggest that deterrence 
is the purpose of the exclusionary rule). 
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of the exclusionary rule throughout its history has been to deter law 
enforcement from engaging in unlawful behavior.114 The exclusionary 
rule has been justified by its “deterrent safeguard,”115 that its “purpose 
is to deter,”116 and that it is an “effective deterrent to police action.”117 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the “major thrust” of the ex-
clusionary rule is deterrence, but courts have also noted additional 
purposes for the rule that may justify excluding evidence.118 Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has justified excluding evidence for 
purposes other than deterrence as well. 
The Supreme Court has stated other purposes for the exclusionary 
rule. One Supreme Court case noted that the “imperative of judicial 
integrity” requires courts to exclude evidence obtained in an uncon-
stitutional manner.119 Another possible purpose is to restore or 
maintain trust in the government, by ensuring the government does 
not profit from its unlawful behavior.120 Another purpose could be to 
apply the exclusionary rule only where there have been massive insti-
tutional failures, at times when law enforcement has pervasive and 
widespread practice of violating basic constitutional protections.121 
                                                     
114 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 210–20 (1960); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); 
see also LAFAVE, supra note 107, at § 1.1(f). 
115 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648–51. 
116 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. 
117 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636–37 (1965). 
118 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12–15; see also LAFAVE supra note 111, at 1.1(f). 
119 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 206; see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic 
Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 48 (2010) (“judicial integrity” is the primary purpose of exclusionary 
rule); Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and 
Deterrence, 75 MO. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010) (asserting that the exclusionary rule serves the 
integrity of the judiciary); Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy: Why 
Judicial Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419, 474 (2013) 
(stating that the exclusionary rule serves judicial integrity). 
120 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Scott 
E. Sundby, Everyman’s Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the Rule of Law (or 
Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 393, 397–
98 (2013) (arguing that the rule of law and the ordinary citizen’s belief in it is a 
justification for the exclusionary rule). This concept rests on the idea that the trust of 
citizens in the U.S. government will be increased when the citizens know the 
government cannot benefit from unconstitutional activity. Id. 
121 See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1050 (1974). 
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Academics have argued for other justifications for the exclusionary 
rule.122 Understanding the purpose of the exclusionary rule is essential 
to determining when the court should suppress evidence and when it 
should not. 
Although other purposes behind the exclusionary rule have been 
cited, the Supreme Court has for decades focused on the primary pur-
pose of deterring future police misconduct as the basis for 
suppressing evidence.123 In recent years, the Supreme Court has em-
phasized the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule over all 
other possible purposes.124 In Herring v. United States, the majority and 
dissenting opinions demonstrate a stark contrast in the debate over 
the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and the effect it has on the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule to the facts of each case.125 The defend-
ant was arrested and his truck was searched based on inaccurate 
information from the police department of a different county.126 
During the search, and based on the mistaken belief that there was a 
warrant, the officers found a firearm and methamphetamine.127 The 
defendant was charged with drug and firearm offenses, and he moved 
to suppress the evidence against him.128 The parties before the 
Supreme Court agreed that the search was unlawful, but the govern-
ment argued that the exclusionary rule should not apply because the 
mistake was the result of a bookkeeping error, and therefore 
suppression would have no deterrent effect.129 
                                                     
122 See, e.g., William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule as a Compensating Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 636 (1983). 
123 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 
(1976). 
124 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011). See generally Scott E. Sundby and 
Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation Stories of the Exclusionary 
Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 391 (2010). 
125 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 n.2 (2009) (majority opinion); id. at 151–
53 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
126 Id. at 137–38. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 138. 
129 Id. at 137. 
AMERICAN UNIVERS ITY  NATIONAL SECURITY LA W BRIEF  
24 
The five-justice majority found that deterrence is the “purpose” of 
the exclusionary rule.130 The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary 
rule “forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.”131 Since 
the Fourth Amendment violation was a mistake, there was no 
deterrent effect in suppressing the evidence against Herring.132 The 
majority emphasized that the only legitimate purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is deterrence.133 If suppressing evidence will not deter 
future police misconduct, then suppression of improperly obtained 
evidence is not appropriate. 
The dissent argued that the evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment should be suppressed because of other important 
purposes behind the exclusionary rule.134 Although the dissent con-
curs that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, 
the dissent argues that the need to preserve judicial integrity and 
ensure that the government does not profit from its wrongdoing is 
also an essential “purpose” of the exclusionary rule.135 The Herring 
majority disagreed with this concept of multiple purposes for the ex-
clusionary rule, and the Supreme Court began to restrict the reach of 
the exclusionary rule to only those cases in which it would have a 
deterrent effect on future police behavior.136 
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the Herring 
view that that deterrence is the only legitimate purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule, stating:137 
                                                     
130 Id. at 139-40 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
131 Id. (“We have stated that this judicially created rule is designed to safeguard Fourth 
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.”) 
132 Id. at 140 (connecting the officers’ mistaken belief that a warrant existed to the Fourth 
Amendment and the court’s holding of the deterrence purpose). 
133 Id.; see also Sundby & Ricca, supra note 124, at 392–93 (asserting prime intention of 
exclusionary rule through analysis of landmark exclusionary cases). 
134 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 151–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995)). 
135 See id. (quoting Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, 
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. 
Rev. 1365, 1389 (1983)). 
136 See id. 
137 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011). 
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[i]t is one thing for the criminal “to go free because the constable has 
blundered.” It is quite another to set the criminal free because the con-
stable has scrupulously adhered to governing law. Excluding evidence 
in such cases deters no police misconduct and imposes substantial 
social costs.138 
The Court explained that “real deterrent value is a ‘necessary 
condition for exclusion,’” and excluding evidence is inappropriate if 
it would not deter future police conduct.139 The majority rejected the 
idea that there were other legitimate purposes to suppress evidence.140 
The Davis Court also emphasized that the exclusionary rule is not 
required by the Constitution, but is “is a ‘prudential’ doctrine, created 
by this Court to ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.’”141 
As a judicially created rule, the Court stressed it must be narrowly 
applied only when necessary to satisfy its sole purpose of 
deterrence.142 
The dissent in Davis vigorously criticized the majority opinion.143 
While the dissent argued about retroactivity and the applicability of 
new constitutional rules to pending cases, its main disagreement with 
the majority concerned the “purpose” of the exclusionary rule.144 The 
dissent argued that the majority opinion “will undermine the exclu-
sionary rule” and limit  its reach to only those cases where it will deter 
future police misconduct.145 
This recent emphasis on the application of the exclusionary rule to 
only Fourth Amendment violations that will deter future police con-
duct is a significant reduction in the application and effect of the ex-
clusionary rule. Prior to this restriction, the exclusionary rule was 
                                                     
138 Id. at 249 (quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo, 
J.)). 
139 Id. at 237 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006)). 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at 236 (explaining that the text of the Fourth Amendment lacks reference to 
the suppression of any evidence obtained through its violation) (quoting Pennsylvania 
Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998), and Elkins v. United States, 
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
142 Id. at 236–37 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1965)). 
143 See id. at 252 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
144 See id. at 256–57. 
145 See id. at 257–60. 
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applied to non-constitutional violations of law.146 This renewed focus 
on excluding evidence that was derived from only constitutional 
violations will impact a significant portion of exclusionary-rule 
jurisprudence. 
C.  Applying the Exclusionary Rule Beyond 
Fourth Amendment Violations 
The Supreme Court has now emphasized the specific purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct by suppressing 
evidence obtained in unconstitutional searches and seizures, which is 
a departure from past case law.147 Historically, the exclusionary rule 
was used in cases that did not involve constitutional violations.148 In 
those cases, courts suppressed evidence obtained by the government 
in violation of statutes, regulations, and other non-constitutional vio-
lations.149 The recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in Herring and 
Davis has significantly limited the exclusionary rule’s application in 
non-constitutional violations of law.150 This new line of cases limiting 
the application of the exclusionary rule conflicts with the cases that 
address Posse Comitatus Act violations. 
The Supreme Court and other federal courts have emphasized that 
violating government regulations is insufficient to trigger the exclu-
sionary rule.151 In United States v. Caceres, the Supreme Court held that 
suppression of tape recordings was not appropriate when the 
recordings were obtained in compliance with the Fourth Amendment 
but in violation of Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) regulations.152 
                                                     
146 See, e.g., Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 348 (2006); Miller v. United States, 
357 U.S. 301, 313–14 (1958); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344–45, (1943) 
(stating that the exclusionary rule requires notice and is used to avoid illegal 
interrogations that lead to unreliable confessions). 
147 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009). 
148 See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749–50 (1979). 
149 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 416–428 (1974). See generally Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. 
REV. 659 (1972). 
150 Davis, 564 U.S. at 236–38. 
151 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 754–56; see also Recent Case, United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826 
(9th Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1880–81 (2015). 
152 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 756–57. 
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Caceres was decided three decades before the Supreme Court started 
limiting the application and purpose of the exclusionary rule.153 In 
Caceres, the Court rejected the application of the exclusionary rule to 
agency regulations, noting that “rigid application of an exclusionary 
rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent im-
pact on the formulation of additional standards to govern prosecuto-
rial and police procedures.”154 While the Supreme Court stopped short 
of declaring that exclusion of evidence is never appropriate for non-
constitutional regulatory violations, circuit courts of appeals have 
more forcefully argued the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to 
regulatory violations.155 
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Supreme Court determined that 
the exclusionary rule should not be applied to violations of the right 
to consular notifications under a treaty.156 The Court explained that 
the exclusionary rule should be used primarily “to deter constitu-
tional violations” and only used to suppress evidence for statutory 
violations in rare cases where “the evidence arose out of statutory 
violations that implicated important Fourth and Fifth Amendment in-
terests.”157 The Court reaffirmed that the focus of the exclusionary rule 
was to deter constitutional violations. 
Circuit courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court’s reluc-
tance to apply the exclusionary rule to statutory and regulatory 
violations.158 In United States v. Lomberga-Camorlinga, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that the exclusionary rule should not be 
used to suppress evidence in violation of a treaty.159 The treaty 
required law enforcement officers to notify a foreign national that he 
                                                     
153 Id. at. 741; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
154 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 755–56. 
155 See United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
156 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 348 (2006). 
157 Id. at 348; see also Caceres, 440 U.S. at 754–57. 
158 See Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886; United States v. Adams, 740 F.3d 40, 43–44 
(1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547. 556–57 (6th Cir. 2006). 
159 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886. 
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has a right to notify his consulate that he was arrested.160 Citing nu-
merous other circuits, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel determined that 
the “exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional 
violations, not for statutory or treaty violations.”161 
In United States v. Adams, the First Circuit concurred, finding that 
the exclusionary rule should not apply to government violations of 
statutes.162 The First Circuit found that “statutory violations, unteth-
ered to the abridgment of constitutional rights, are not sufficiently 
egregious to justify suppression.”163 The Sixth Circuit agreed, stating 
in United States v. Abdi, “the exclusionary rule is an appropriate sanc-
tion for a statutory violation only where the statute specifically 
provides for suppression as a remedy or the statutory violation impli-
cates underlying constitutional rights such as the right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure.”164 These courts have emphasized 
that Congress alone should write the exclusionary rule into a statute, 
and courts should not read into a statutory scheme an exclusionary 
remedy when Congress has prescribed a remedy other than exclu-
sion.165 These circuit courts stress that the exclusionary rule should be 
                                                     
160 Id.; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261. 
161 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886; see also United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 
1040 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically 
reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 
424 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the 
exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right); United States 
v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 
1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify 
imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or 
right or evidence that Congress intended exclusion as a remedy); United States v. 
Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737 
(5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting 
suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule “was not 
fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not ‘authorized’ 
by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of 
individuals.”). 
162 Adams, 740 F.3d at 43–44. 
163 Id. 
164 United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556–57 (6th Cir. 2006). 
165 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 512–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (pen register 
statute); United States v. Feng, 277 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002) (prosecutor’s alleged 
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limited to constitutional violations, and only be used for statutory 
violations when authorized by Congress, or when the statute is so 
closely connected to a constitutional right that the exclusionary rule is 
needed to protect that right. 
Suppression of evidence is also not appropriate for a violation of 
agency regulations.166 In United States v. Hinton, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals categorically stated, “suppression is not the appro-
priate remedy for a failure to follow agency regulations.”167 Hinton—
another case decided prior to Herring and Davis—stressed that the 
exclusionary rule was designed to apply to constitutional violations, 
not regulatory ones.168 The court clearly stated that the “relevant 
inquiry is whether a constitutional right, not an agency regulation, has 
been violated.”169 Hinton and other circuit cases are entirely consistent 
with the shift in the Supreme Court’s view of the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule.170 
The Supreme Court has also confirmed that the exclusionary rule 
should only be applied when it deters police misconduct.171 The Court 
and subsequent Ninth Circuit cases emphasize that the exclusionary 
rule should only apply to conduct that violates the Constitution, not 
to lesser violations of statutes or agency regulations.172 Despite this 
long line of cases restricting the use of the exclusionary rule, courts 
have considered applying it to the violation of the Posse Comitatus 
Act, a statute, and to agency regulations that apply the statutory 
proscriptions. These views on the purpose of the exclusionary rule are 
at odds with the evolving views on the role of the military in domestic 
law enforcement. Courts still consider applying the exclusionary rule 
                                                     
violation of criminal bribery statute); United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042, 1049 
(9th Cir. 1986) (unauthorized IRS disclosure of tax return information). 
166 See United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2000). 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 675. 
169 Id. 
170 Id.; see also United States v. Ani, 138 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the 
exclusionary rule was not applicable to a non-constitutional violation of U.S. Customs 
regulation). 
171 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141–43 (2009). 
172 United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755–56 (1979); Hinton, 222 F.3d at 674–75. 
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to a criminal statute, and regulations implementing it, when the acts 
concern the use of the military as law enforcement. 
 
IV .  THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND 
THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 
The Ninth Circuit’s application of the exclusionary rule to the Posse 
Comitatus Act is inconsistent with evolving Supreme Court doctrine. 
The Posse Comitatus Act is a criminal statute; the violation of it carries 
a fine and prison for the actor.173 In 1878, Congress did not write in the 
act that evidence derived in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act 
should be excluded in a criminal trial, and it has not added one in the 
140 years since its enactment.174 The Posse Comitatus Act applies to 
the Navy and Marine Corps not by its language, but indirectly, 
through congressionally mandated agency regulations.175 The exclu-
sionary rule should not apply to Posse Comitatus Act violations 
because a violation of the act is not a constitutional violation. 
Although some courts have been reluctant to apply an exclusionary 
rule to Posse Comitatus Act cases in the past, other courts have freely 
applied it to evidence seized during a Posse Comitatus Act violation. 
The current Supreme Court guidance is that the exclusionary rule 
should only be used to suppress evidence derived from constitutional 
violations, and only be used when it will likely deter future police 
misconduct. Application of the exclusionary rule to Posse Comitatus 
Act violations does not fit well into either purpose. This section will 
explore the cases that have struggled to find the appropriate connec-
tion between the improper use of the military to assist in law 
enforcement activities and the evidence obtained from that improper 
use. 
 
                                                     
173 Posse Comitatus Act, §15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 
(2016)). 
174 Id. Congress amended the statute only once, to include the Air Force after it was 
separated from the Army pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947. 
175 See 10 U.S.C. § 275 (2016) (renumbered from section 375); DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD 
INSTRUCTION 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
(Feb. 27, 2013). 
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A.  The Posse Comitatus Act and Wounded Knee 
The Posse Comitatus Act was a little-used and relatively obscure 
statute for almost a century, until it became prominent in the criminal 
cases that resulted from an incident at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, 
in 1973.176 A group protesting the treatment of Native Americans took 
control of the small town of Wounded Knee.177 State and federal law 
enforcement officers responded and issued orders prohibiting indi-
viduals from bypassing law enforcement roadblocks and entering the 
town.178 The military also responded to provide assistance to law en-
forcement.179 Several individuals were arrested and prosecuted for 
crimes including obstructing a law enforcement officer in the lawful 
performance of his duties during the course of a civil disturbance.180 
Four defendants, charged in separate cases raised a claim that the 
military involvement with civilian law enforcement required an 
acquittal.181 The defendants claimed that their convictions should be 
overturned because the military’s assistance to law enforcement vio-
lated the Posse Comitatus Act.182 The defendants argued that an 
essential element of the charged crime required that the law enforce-
ment officers were lawfully engaged in their duties.183 Since law 
enforcement called on the military in violation of federal law, the 
                                                     
176 United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975); United States v. Red 
Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975); United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D. 
1974); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974). 
177 Cf. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1376. 
178 Andrew H. Malcolm, Occupation of Wounded Knee is Ended, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 1973), 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0508.
html. 
179 Red Feather, 392 F.Supp. at 921. 
180 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (1970), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 231(1994). See Jaramillo, 380 F. 
Supp. 1375; Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368; Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916; McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 
186. 
181 Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375; Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368; Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916; 
McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186. 
182 See Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375; Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368; Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916; 
McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186. 
183 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (whoever obstructs a “law enforcement officer lawfully engaged 
in the lawful performance of his official duties . . .”). 
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defendants claimed, the military was not engaged in lawful duties and 
the convictions should not stand.184 
Separate courts reached different conclusions on whether the 
military’s actions violated the Posse Comitatus Act.185 These cases did 
not specifically discuss the exclusionary rule. Rather, the issue was 
whether the government could prove an essential element of the crime 
if the military violated the Posse Comitatus Act.186 However, the 
Wounded Knee cases provided different and conflicting ways to eval-
uate whether the military acted in violation of the Posse Comitatus 
Act, and opened the door for other defendants to argue that suppres-
sion of evidence is the appropriate remedy when the military 
unlawfully engages in law enforcement activity. 
B.  Suppressing Evidence in Posse 
Comitatus Act Violations 
The Wounded Knee cases challenged the lawfulness of police conduct 
when the military assists them in law enforcement activities. These 
cases led to the next logical step: defendants requesting the suppres-
sion of evidence gathered by the military in violation of the Posse 
Comitatus Act.187 While the Supreme Court has never ruled on a Posse 
Comitatus case, the lower state and federal courts developed a con-
sistent pattern. These cases arose long before the Supreme Court 
                                                     
184 Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 925; see also Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1381 (upholding 
acquittal on charge of obstructing law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee on 
grounds that the prosecution failed to prove that the Posse Comitatus Act was not 
violated by the military’s contributions to the operation, thus raising a reasonable doubt 
as to whether the law enforcement officers were lawfully engaged in the performance 
of duties). But see McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194 (holding that evidence of military 
activity at Wounded Knee was insufficient to overcome presumption that law 
enforcement officers acted in performance of duties). 
185 See Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1381 (holding that the military’s actions violated the 
Posse Comitatus Act); Banks, 383 F. Supp. at 376 (stating that the military’s actions 
violated the Posse Comitatus Act); Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 925 (stating that the 
military’s supporting actions did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act). 
186 See Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1375; Banks, 383 F. Supp. at 368; Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 
at 916. 
187 See United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. 
Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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began narrowing the application of the exclusionary rule to its pur-
pose to deter police misconduct, and the courts developed a common 
response to requests to suppress evidence obtained by the military in 
violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. 
In the pre-Herring cases, courts noted that the Posse Comitatus Act 
does not contain a provision calling for suppression of evidence ob-
tained in violation of the act.188 Courts have noted that Congress has 
the option to write the exclusionary rule into statutes, but chose 
instead to use criminal sanctions to deter military misconduct.189 The 
courts then note that lower courts could create an exclusionary rule 
for violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, just as the Supreme Court 
did for Fourth Amendment violations in Boyd.190 Each court then de-
termined whether there existed “widespread and repeated violations” 
of the Posse Comitatus Act that warranted judicial creation and 
employment of the exclusionary rule.191 
In United States v. Walden, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
noted that there was no statutory exclusionary rule for the Posse 
Comitatus Act and declined to create one where the defendant alleged 
that U.S. Marine Corps investigators obtained evidence in violation of 
the Posse Comitatus Act.192 The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this rule in 
1995, when the court found that the exclusionary rule is not available 
                                                     
188 See, e.g., Griley, 814 F.2d at 976 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to 
violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, and finding no grounds to apply the exclusionary 
rule based on the facts of the case). 
189 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2016) (criminalizing the use of the Army and Air Force to execute 
the laws, and providing a two-year maximum sentence for violations). 
190 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see also Griley, 814 F.2d at 976. 
191 Walden, 490 F.2d at 372 (acknowledging that the exclusionary rule could apply, but 
declining to exclude evidence in that case); see also United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 
1266, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (stating exclusionary rule is available but declined 
to apply it to the facts in that case); Griley, 814 F.2d at 976 (stating there is no 
exclusionary rule for Posse Comitatus Act violations and no reason to adopt one in that 
case); Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (excluding evidence derived 
from a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act). 
192 Walden, 490 F.2d at 372; see also Griley, 814 F.2d at 967 (stating that there is no 
exclusionary rule for Posse Comitatus Act violations and no reason to adopt one in that 
case). 
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for violations of the Posse Comitatus Act.193 The Al-Talib court empha-
sized that the exclusionary rule is clearly unavailable when the 
military did not seize any evidence.194 The Fifth and Seventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeals concurred in this view; both noted that the statute 
lacks an exclusionary rule and both declined to create one when the 
case before them did not involve widespread and repeated 
violations.195 
The Ninth Circuit also agreed.196 In dealing with allegations that 
the U.S. Navy violated regulations that impose Posse Comitatus Act-
like restrictions, the court determined “an exclusionary rule should 
not be applied to violations [of regulations that apply the Posse Comi-
tatus Act to the Navy] until a need to deter future violations is 
demonstrated.”197 
State courts also shared in this view. The Alaska appellate court 
found there was no exclusionary rule applicable to Posse Comitatus 
Act violations and no reason to create one without widespread or re-
peated violations.198 The Washington State Supreme Court went 
further to state that there is no exclusionary rule for evidence obtained 
in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.199 Florida and Kansas have 
also issued similar rulings, noting that there is no exclusionary rule in 
the Posse Comitatus Act and declining to create a judicially imposed 
exclusionary rule.200 Each of the state and federal courts who reviewed 
potential Posse Comitatus Act violations declined to impose the ex-
clusionary rule and suppress evidence derived from the alleged 
violations. However, each court noted it could create an exclusionary 
                                                     
193 United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923 (1995). 
194 Id. 
195 United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 
112 (5th Cir. 1986); Hayes v. Hawes, 921 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1990). 
196 United States v. Roberts 779 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1986). 
197 Id. at 568 (citing Wolffs, 594 F.2d at 77, 85, and Walden, 490 F.2d at 376–77). 
198 Moon v. State, 785 P.2d 45 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (the court noted there was no 
history of Posse Comitatus Act violations in Alaska). 
199 State v. Valdobinos, 858 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1993). 
200 See Taylor v. State, 640 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule should not be applied, although the Naval Investigative Service’s 
involvement may have violated the Posse Comitatus Act); State v. Roberts, 786 P.2d 630 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that even if a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act 
occurred, the extraordinary remedy of exclusion is not appropriate). 
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rule if the military engaged in “widespread and repeated violations” 
of the Posse Comitatus Act or its implementing regulations.201 
All of these cases preceded the Supreme Court’s recent exclusion-
ary-rule restrictions.202 Although these cases noted the possibility of 
creating an exclusionary rule for Posse Comitatus Act violations, each 
court declined to suppress evidence in situations where the Posse 
Comitatus Act was violated.203 Since courts were reluctant to apply the 
exclusionary rule even before the Supreme Court’s recent declaration 
that the exclusionary rule should only be used for constitutional vio-
lations, and only when it will deter future police misconduct, it 
seemed likely that the exclusionary rule would never be applied to the 
Posse Comitatus Act. Yet in United States v. Dreyer, the Ninth Circuit 
took a different path. 
C.  The Dreyer Decision 
The Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to revisit the applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule to the Posse Comitatus Act after the 
Supreme Court decisions in Herring and Davis.204 In Dreyer, a Navy 
Criminal Investigative Service (“NCIS”) agent used a software 
program to search for child pornography on the internet.205 The NCIS 
agent conducted a broad search of all computers in the state of 
Washington, not just the computers of those in the military.206 The 
                                                     
201 See supra notes 199, 200; infra note and 202. 
202 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (finding that the exclusionary rule 
is applicable “where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served” 
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
203 See United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1279 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); United States 
v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply 
to violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, and finding no grounds to apply the 
exclusionary rule based on the facts of the case); State v. Roberts, 786 F.2d 630 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1990); Taylor, 640 So. 2d 1127. 
204 Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 804 F.3d 1266. 
205 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 827, 830–31 (holding that although the agent was a civilian, the 
Posse Comitatus Act restrictions applied to civilian officers working for the Navy (citing 
United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2000))). 
206 Id. at 827. 
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software was only able to access information that was publicly 
available, so the search complied with the Fourth Amendment.207 
The NCIS agent found evidence of child pornography, determined 
it belonged to someone outside of the military, and turned it over to 
local law enforcement.208 The local officer obtained a search warrant 
for the computer, found the child pornography, and Dreyer was 
charged in federal court.209 Dreyer moved to suppress the evidence of 
child pornography, claiming that the search conducted by the NCIS 
agent violated the Posse Comitatus Act and that the exclusionary rule 
should apply.210 The district court denied the motion, Dreyer was con-
victed at trial, and he appealed both his conviction and the denial of 
the motion to suppress.211 
The three-judge appellate panel found that the NCIS agent did 
violate the regulations implementing the Posse Comitatus Act when 
he conducted an internet search in the state of Washington for evi-
dence of child pornography.212 The court then turned to the question 
of whether the exclusionary rule should apply to suppress the 
evidence gathered in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.213 The 
panel held that the evidence gathered in violation of the Posse Comi-
tatus Act should be suppressed.214 
The three-judge panel ignored the recent Supreme Court cases that 
restricted the use of a judicially created exclusionary rule and instead 
focused on an old Ninth Circuit precedent that contemplated creating 
an exclusionary rule for the Posse Comitatus Act if there were “wide-
spread and repeated violations.”215 The court emphasized that Posse 
Comitatus Act violations of the NCIS agent were “widespread and 
repeated,” therefore they believed that the evidence should be 
excluded. The government appealed this decision and the Ninth 
Circuit granted rehearing en banc. 
                                                     
207 See id. 
208 Id. at 828. 
209 Id. at 828–29. 
210 Id. at 829. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 832. 
213 Id. at 835–36. 
214 Id. at 837. 
215 Id. at 836 (citing United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
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The en banc court affirmed the determination that the NCIS 
violated the Posse Comitatus Act, but declined to suppress the evi-
dence.216 However, the Ninth Circuit decision significantly departs 
from Supreme Court precedence. The Ninth Circuit found that the 
exclusionary rule was available, but declined to apply it to the facts in 
this case.217 In doing so, the court misinterpreted Supreme Court prec-
edent and inverted the test to determine when the exclusionary rule 
should apply.218 
The Dreyer court misinterprets Supreme Court precedent. Dreyer 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Hudson v. Michigan began to 
restrict the scope of the exclusionary rule.219 But the en banc court dis-
missed the cases that limited the exclusionary rule solely to violations 
of constitutional rights.220 The Ninth Circuit argued that the Supreme 
Court sanctions the use of the exclusionary rule to enforce some 
statutes, although each case it cited as support were actually fifty-
year-old cases that had Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations.221 
The court never cited Herring and mentioned Davis only in passing.222 
Once the Ninth Circuit had softened Supreme Court precedent to 
establish that the exclusionary rule may be applicable for statutory 
violations, the court then turned to the issue of whether the exclusion-
ary rule could be applied to Posse Comitatus Act violations.223 The 
court determined it could because the Supreme Court had never 
specifically ruled that the exclusionary rule did not apply to this stat-
ute, stating, “We know of no controlling precedent precluding appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule for a violation of the [Posse Comitatus 
Act or the regulations that apply it to the Navy].”224 The Ninth Circuit 
ignored Sanchez-Llamas, which stated that the exclusionary rule 
                                                     
216 Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1279 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
217 Id. at 1279–80. 
218 Id. at 1278–79. 
219 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 839 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). 
220 Dreyer, 804 F.3d at 1278–79. 
221 Id. at 1278–79. 
222 Id. at 1278. 
223 Id. at 1279. 
224 Id. 
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should not be used for non-constitutional violations of statutes.225 The 
Ninth Circuit stated the Posse Comitatus Act has “constitutional 
underpinnings,” citing the Third Amendment and legislative 
history.226 After diminishing Supreme Court precedent to allow exclu-
sion of evidence for statutory violation not specifically precluded by 
a Supreme Court opinion, it ultimately declined to apply the 
exclusionary rule, but strongly stated that it would if there were future 
violations by the military.227 Therefore, the highest court to address 
this issue, and its most recent decision, holds that the exclusionary 
rule is an available remedy for violations of the Posse Comitatus Act. 
 
V.  RECONCILING THE POSSE COMITATUS 
ACT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE  
The Dreyer decision conflicts with the recent line of Supreme Court 
cases on the application of the exclusionary rule. The decision in 
Dreyer is incorrect, but understandable. The Ninth Circuit was react-
ing to the same concerns that led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus 
Act one and a half centuries ago. The military engaged in law enforce-
ment activity, and did so at the direction at the local and low-level 
civil officials. The facts demonstrated the military engaged in law 
enforcement without regard for the traditional restrictions placed on 
the military when enforcing the law. While the actions of the Navy 
investigators were improper, using the exclusionary rule to suppress 
evidence is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The exclusionary 
rule should not be used for government misconduct that violates a 
statute or a regulation. Further, the exclusionary rule should only be 
used to deter police misconduct. These two issues will be explored 
below. 
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A.  The Exclusionary Rule and Violation of 
Statutes  
The exclusionary rule is an extraordinary remedy, one that should be 
used as a “last resort.”228 It should not be used for a violation of a stat-
ute.229 There is a simple reason for this: Congress declined to write the 
exclusionary rule into the statute they created. Congress created the 
statutory rules that govern police and military behavior when it 
enacted the Posse Comitatus Act. Congress also determined the con-
sequences for violating its rules—offenders could be fined and impris-
oned for violating the act. Congress chose to use criminal sanctions to 
punish persons for using the military as law enforcement. The 
Supreme Court in Herring and Davis held that courts should use the 
exclusionary rule for constitutional violations, not statutory 
violations.230 
Congress could have written an exclusionary rule into the Posse 
Comitatus Act, and Congress could also have added an exclusionary 
rule to the act in the 140 years since it became law. Congress wrote 
exclusionary rules into other statutes in the last 140 years.231 Since 
Congress has not chosen to specifically exclude any evidence derived 
from the use of the military to enforce the laws, the courts should not 
presume that Congress wants exclusion of evidence as a remedy. 
Evidence derived from a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act should 
be admissible in a criminal trial. 
 
B.  The Exclusionary Rule and Deterring 
Police Misconduct 
Excluding evidence resulting from the misuse of the military in civil-
ian law enforcement does not deter future police misconduct. 
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Violations of the Posse Comitatus Act occur when the military is used 
to execute the law.232 Often, as was the case in Dreyer, the military 
violates the Posse Comitatus Act without the request or assistance of 
law enforcement.233 Civilian law enforcement obtained a search war-
rant, arrested, charged, and prosecuted Dreyer only after the military 
violated the Posse Comitatus Act—no civilian law enforcement offi-
cial requested the military to execute the law.234 Therefore, the courts 
should not punish civilian authorities when the military violates the 
law. 
Excluding evidence will not deter future military misconduct. In 
Dreyer, the military turned illegally obtained evidence over to civilian 
law enforcement because it had no connection to the military. Since 
the military did not have an interest in the prosecution of the case, 
excluding the evidence would not impact the military. Using the ex-
clusionary rule in a civilian prosecution does not deter future military 
misconduct. Excluding evidence would punish civilian law enforce-
ment for the misdeeds of the military even though civilian law 
enforcement never participated or requested the improper military 
actions. Since the actions were done by the military, civilian law 
enforcement cannot be deterred by the exclusion of evidence. Since 
the prosecution is by civilians, it is unlikely that the military will be 
deterred from future conduct that violates the Posse Comitatus Act. 
Therefore, excluding evidence is not an effective deterrent. 
Criminal punishment for those who misuse the military is an 
effective deterrent. Military commanders who use the military for do-
mestic law enforcement can be sent to prison and fined. Although 
criminal prosecutions of military commanders are very rare, the mere 
fact that a commander could face prison can cause the commander to 
refrain from unlawful conduct. This is a significant deterrent, and the 
courts should respect the legislative process by refusing to add addi-
tional sanctions. It is Congress’s role to decide what the appropriate 
punishment is for the statutes that it enacts. 
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VI .  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has struggled with the proper application of the 
judicially created exclusionary rule, and the Court has restricted its 
application in recent years. The exclusionary rule should be used in 
limited circumstances when police violate the Constitution, and when 
excluding the evidence gained through a constitutional violation 
would deter future police misconduct.235 The Posse Comitatus Act 
criminalizes the use of the military to execute the law, and deters mis-
use of the military through criminal sanctions.236 Both the exclusion-
ary rule and the Posse Comitatus Act are deeply rooted in U.S. history, 
and both were created to ensure that government officials act in ways 
that protect civil liberties. However, these doctrines must not be 
mixed. The exclusionary rule should not be applied to exclude 
evidence derived from a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. 
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